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FRONTIERS, ISLANDS, FORESTS, STONES:
Mapping the Geography of a German Identity in the
Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1900
Pieter M. Judson
In July of 1885, the newly founded League for the Bohe
mian Woods {Bohmerwaldbun^ advertised a special sale in its
quarterly newsletter under the headline “Relief Maps of South
ern Bohemia.” Using the maps of the Imperial and Royal Mili
tary-Geographic Institute in Vienna, a retired infantry lieuten
ant had developed a technology for producing finely detailed
three-dimensional reliefs, which the journal praised enthusi
astically. The league had negotiated an agreement with the in
ventor to produce relief maps of the Bohemian Woods at a re
duced price, depending on how many orders he received. “We
therefore urge all municipal and county governments, school
administrators, financial institutions, and associations of every
kind,” wrote the editors, “to consider ... whether they wish to
order this extremely important product, which will contribute
considerably to [the growth of] exact knowledge about our
land.”i
In the 1880s, “exact knowledge about our land” became a
new and vital concern for German nationalist organizations
like the League for the Bohemian Woods. As voluntary asso
ciations like this one labored to create a sense of national
identity among German speakers in the multiethnic Habsburg
Monarchy, they situated that identity in local geography and
history rather than, as tradition dictated, in allegiance to cer
tain abstract cultural Ideals. Familiar local relationships were
to be redefined in terms of nationalist struggle as a way of
making German identity a more compelling part of local village
This paper is dedicated to Milan Homak and Lars Larson, with whom I
witnessed the return of several Sudeten Germans to southern Bohemia and
Moravia and some of its rhetorical consequences. 1 would like to thank Laura
L. Downs, Daniel A. Segal, and Douglas McKeown for their insightful com
ments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Mittheilungen des deutschen Bdhmerwaldbundes [MDB], no. 2 (1885):
35. The journal cited the expert opinion of the foremost geographic journal of
Germany, that this new type of relief map constituted a potentially rich font of
knowledge for schoolchildren and amateur geographers.
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life. German speakers in the ethnically mixed Moravian town of
Iglau (Jihlava),^ for example, should no longer think of them
selves as Iglauers or even as Moravians but above all as Ger
mans. Their ties to other Germans in Central Europe must
now outweigh the familiar social and commercial relationships
they enjoyed with neighbors who spoke Czech.
This transformation of identity would be accomplished by
locating national identity in the geographic spaces people oc
cupied, by redefining those spaces according to their particular
nationalist significance. To continue with the example of Iglau,
the town became known in the 1880s primarily as an island of
Germans surrounded by a sea of hostile Czechs. Provinces like
Moravia, where many such islands were to be found, became
known as frontiers, where Germans and Slavs met on imagined
borders. New historical traditions were gradually developed to
justify this reconceptualization of local identity in national
terms. Activists claimed the forests of Southern Bohemia (the
Bohemian Wood), for example, as the ancestral home of an
cient Teutons, and they pointed out the ways in which archi
tectural styles and town planning, the very stones themselves,
confirmed the uniquely German character of the landscape.
Using several of these related strategies, German nationalists
hoped one day to supplant parochial village identities with
more self-consciously nationalist ones.
In this paper I examine the way nationalist activists in the
Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy transformed their
rhetoric about the German nation, using spatial metaphors
that attributed a national identity to the very landscape itself.
In doing so these activists sought to establish a common and
politically useful national identity for all German-speaking in
habitants of Austria’s socially and geographically diverse re
gions.^ German identity, formerly a desirable elite cultural
^ Wherever possible I have tried to use English terms for place names in
the ethnically mixed regions of the monarchy. Where such terms do not exist, 1
have relied on nineteenth-century German place names as they appeared in
the newspapers, almanacs, and records of voluntary associations that 1 exam
ined for this paper, and 1 have added the common Czech, Slovene, Polish, or
Romanian name in parentheses. The choice should in no way imply a prefer
ence for the German names on my part.
^ In 1867 the unitary Habsburg Empire had been divided into an Aus
trian and an Hungarian state, each with its own domestic government but
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commodity, became more of a popular local identity in the
1880s, defined empirically according to language use and
rooted in physical landscapes. If earlier definitions of German
ness stressing culture and humanist conviction never died out
completely, the radically changing political and social condi
tions in the empire helped foster newer, more empirically
based forms of self-identification. These later nationalisms pre
sumed a transhistorical concept of identity, a concept that re
quired the maintenance of cultural purity. Activists anchored
the new German Identity in identifiable spaces, conferring a
specifically German identity on the land Itself and staking a
claim to any territoiy that was either currently or had been
historically occupied by German speakers.
All too often, historians analyze the emergence of national
ist differences in any society by assuming that people neces
sarily privilege one set of attributes (such as language use) over
others (such as common regional culture). Yet, contrary to
popular myths about the nature of politics in the multicultural
Habsburg Monarchy, differences in language use alone did not
magically produce nationalist politics. Those who believe that
class or regional politics inevitably crystallized around existing
and historic differences of language Ignore at their peril the
situational specificity of national identities. Differences in lan
guage use may have been decisive for identity formation in
some, but certainly not all, cases, as Gary Cohen, Istvan Deak,
and Katherine Verdery have demonstrated in works on differ-

both sharing a common foreign and commercial policy. The Habsburg mon
arch was both emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. This paper deals with
the Austrian half of the dual monarchy, a state whose territoiy included the
present-day states of Austria, the Czech Republic (Bohemia and Moravia), and
Slovenia as well as substantial pieces of Italy, Poland, and the Ukraine. For
convenience 1 refer to this state as “Austria” or simply as the "monarchy.” The
following is a breakdown of how people identified their “language of daily use”
[Umgangssprache] according to the census of 1880, the first to record this
information; German: 36.75 percent; Czech; 23.77 percent; Polish; 14.86 per
cent; Ukrainian; 12.81 percent; Slovene; 5.23 percent; Serbo-Croatian: 2.6
percent; Italian; 3.07 percent; Romanian; 0.87 percent. See Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds.. Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918,
vol. 3/1 (Vienna: Verlag der Osterr, 1980) table 1.
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ent regions and institutions of the monarchy.^ Cohen’s mas
terful work on Prague’s German-speaking minority clearly
shows that, over time, people of the urban lower classes often
changed nationalities if no German nationalist community in
frastructure (clubs, schools, theaters, etc.) adequately ad
dressed their social needs in specifically German nationalist
terms.
Furthermore, if we examine early forms of German na
tionalist rhetoric, we find that they were not even necessarily
founded on language use. To mid-nineteenth-century Austri
ans who thought about it, German identity corresponded far
more to the cultivation of middle-class, liberal cultural values
like education, enlightenment, individual self-control, and eco
nomic independence. The very first German nationalist asso
ciation founded during the Revolution of 1848 proclaimed a
belief that Germanness was based “not simply on the soil of
birth or language of culture but rather on ... nobility of action
and the worthiness of conviction.’’^ In theory at least, indi
viduals from any background—Jews, Slavs, peasants, and
workers—could eventually attain a German identity through
education and acculturation. German nationalists in the
Habsburg Monarchy viewed Germanness as a relatively open
identity, one available to anyone who adopted its principles
and lived according to its norms, even though few individuals
outside the middle class might actually obtain the requisite
income or education. For these German speakers, nationalism
served as an ideology of public integration in Central and East
ern Europe, one that would eventually wipe away the back
ward and particularist attitudes held by uneducated peasants
and Slavs, joining them all in a great German liberal nation.
These early German nationalists rarely Justified their pre
eminent social position in terms of their numbers, even though
See Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival Germans in Prague,
1861-1914 (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1981): Istvan Deak, Beyond
Nationalism: A Political and Social History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 18481918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Deak, “Comments,” Austrian
History Yearbook, no. 3 (1967); and Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villag
ers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic and Ethnic Change (Berkeley: Uni
versity of California Press, 1983).
^ Schwarz-Roth-Gold, a newspaper published by the Association of Ger
mans in Austria, no. 1(11 July 1848).
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theirs was the language spoken by the largest number of peo
ple (ca. 36 percent) in the monarchy. Rather, they constantly
referred to their culture’s historic mission as creator of a civi
lized public sphere in Central Europe. According to these lib
eral nationalists, neither geographic location nor the sheer
number of people who spoke a given language was as decisive
in determining a group’s relative status or power in the monar
chy as was quality, defined by the group’s cultural and finan
cial achievement. As one nationalist author pointed out, “With
the exception of Italian, German is the only one of all the lan
guages spoken in the Austrian Monarchy that has an absolute
value: the others have only a relative, local value.’’®
The internal structure of the empire encouraged this kind
of cultural definition of German nationality. Proficiency in
German was a crucial prerequisite for any upwardly mobile
bourgeois seeking higher social status by entering government
or military service. In reply to Czech nationalist accusations of
government favoritism toward German candidates for the civil
service, for example, the Liberal minister of the interior could
state, “the primary consideration in bureaucratic appointments
is an official’s ability to do his Job. If a candidate is fluent in
German, then no matter what his ethnic background, he would
be considered qualified in this respect.”’’ As the language of
much interregional commerce, German was also closely asso
ciated with financial and social achievement. Many German
liberals presumed that as upwardly mobile Czech or Slovene
Burger became financially successful and better educated, they
would naturally Identify themselves as Germans, as indeed
many did in the 1850s and 1860s.® Nor did early AustroGerman nationalists demand what we would call complete
ethnic assimilation from those who aspired to a German iden® Anonymous pamphlet. Die Deutschen tm Nationalitatenstaat Osterreich
(Meran, 1887) 21.
’ Gustav Kolmer, Parlament imd Verfassung in Osterreich, 8 vols.
(Vienna & Leipzig: C. Fromme, 1902-14) 1:89.
® See, for example, Peter Vodopivec' discussion of Slovene academic and
writer Dragotin Dezman in “Die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Ansichten des
deutschen Burgertums in Krain vom Ende der sechziger bis zum Beginn der
achtziger Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts” in Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich
des heutigen Slowenien, 1848-1941, ed. H. Rumpler and A. Suppan (Vienna:
Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, 1988) particularly 87-93.
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tity. In theoiy, at least, German nationalists encouraged the
local preservation of non-German languages and cultural tra
ditions. After all, what language one spoke in the private
sphere of the home or even at the local community level was
hardly a matter of political concern. Nationalists did, however,
expect strict assimilation to cosmopolitan German values in
the context of one’s public or institutional life.^
Since the very existence of the central state guaranteed
the German language a functionally privileged status, German
liberals thought of themselves proudly as the monarchy’s
Staatsvolk, or “state people,’’ and not at all equivalent to the
other competing ethnic groups. They connected their own spe
cial status to the very survival of the state. Not surprisingly,
the sporadic attempts by a handful of German activists to de
velop a politics organized specifically around German national
ism before 1880 typically met with embarrassed silence or
outright opposition from liberal leaders. German speakers
needed no special nationalist movement: theirs was after all
the language and culture of civilization. For the same reason
German liberals interpreted early Slav nationalist demands for
linguistic parity in the 1860s and 1870s more as a threat to
the very state itself, and to the liberal ideas of civilization it
embodied, than as a national threat to the Germans.
Neither this liberal vision of German identity nor the lib
eral understanding of community was completely transparent
in its enthusiasm for the eventual inclusion of ethnic others in
the nation. Most liberals believed that full membership in the
civic community had to be earned. They considered the vote,
that ultimate token of inclusion, to be a political function as
signed to people who had reached a certain level of eeonomic
independence and educational achievement. In the 1870s, for
example, German Liberal party leader Ernst von Plener chal
lenged the Socialists’ characterization of the vote as a natural
or civic right, calling it instead a function “that the state can
^ German Liberal party discussions of the proposed texts of a nationality
clause for the 1867 constitution stressed the local rights of individual ethnic
groups while retaining a privileged position for German in the administration.
See especially Gerald Stourzh, “Die Gleichberechtlgung der Nationalitaten und
die osterreichische Dezemberverfassung von 1867" in Der osterreichischungarische Ausgleich von 1867. Vorgeschichte und Wirkungen. ed. P. Berger
(Vienna: Herold, 1967) 186-218.
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confer ori those who offer a guarantee that they will exercise it
properly.
Laboring and petty-bourgeois males might gain
the vote as they beeame more like the liberals themselves, that
is, as they achieved sufficient property and education.
The same eould be said of liberal ideas about the monar
chy’s various ethnic and religious groups. Neither geographic
location nor sheer quantity (the number of people who spoke a
given language) was as decisive in determining a group’s rela
tive status or power as was quality, defined by eultural and
finaneial achievement. Liberals based this understanding of
the world on a set of erucial (if unacknowledged) epistemologi
cal dualities that underlay their visions. They divided the uni
verse into two theoretically separate and implicitly hierarchi
cally arranged spheres, the worlds of active and passive citi
zenship. The boundaries separating these two worlds were of
ten masked by a universalist rhetoric that stressed active par
ticipation and civic Inclusion. Liberals insisted on political
equality for the inhabitants of the publie sphere. Nevertheless,
the importance they assigned to financial independence and
edueation enabled them to maintain hierarchically arranged
relationships with the women and children, as well as racial
and class inferiors, whose immaturity and dependent status
kept them in the private sphere. One of liberalism’s most pow
erful legaeies to the new nationalism in Austria was to be the
translation of this fundamental relationship between the public
and private spheres into a new set of publie hierarchies organ
ized around national Identities.
An 1861 pamphlet entitled “The Germans in Krain” illus
trates the startling ways in whieh ideas about national identity
were still developing along the lines of liberal hierarchie con
ceptions of active and passive citizenship rather than accord
ing to purely linguistle or ethnic concepts of identity. “ The
pamphlet replied to Slovene nationalist arguments that the
identity of the province Krain (roughly eomparable to presentday Slovenia) was primarily Slavie, a claim based purely on the
See Stenographische Protokolle des Hauses der Abgeordneten (Vienna,
1867-1911) session of 17 December 1874; also quoted in Wilhelm Wadi, Liberalismus und soziale Frage (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie
der Wissenschaften, 1987) 233.
* ^ Anonymous, Das Deutschtum in Krain. Ein Wort zw Aujkldrung (Graz
1862).
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evidence of how few people spoke German as opposed to Slo
vene. The German-speaking author attributed the misguided
belief that linguistic use alone determined national identity to
the bad influence of Napoleonic ideas about universal suffrage.
(“Popular rule established by a revolution is always Inimical to
culture.”) The author then proceeded to explain why the na
tional identity of Krain should be considered German. To begin
with, “the history of the region suffices to prove that Krain was
always a part of the German Confederation. Thus political
tradition (which also placed Bohemia and Moravia in the Ger
man confederation) pointed to a common identity with the rest
of the German lands. But what political history tells us is of
minor importance compared to what cultural history can reveal
about national identity. “Whoever ... wanted to make any kind
of career for himself, or to educate himself in any way, spoke
and read German.... Over time,” continued the writer, “things
developed so that on one side stood a raw, ignorant mass op
posed to a small number of Germans on the other side who
enjoyed the civilized pleasures of life.” Here the author admit
ted that German speakers constituted a minority of the popu
lation. Nevertheless, their mere presence gave the province a
German national identity.
The author then reminded the reader that a German cul
tural identity is certainly available to other peoples. After all,
the Slav “who strove for education and who sought out Ger
mans in order to gain culture from them was only following a
natural urge; he sought his advantage.... Humanity strives for
knowledge and culture, which the Slavs can only seek from the
Germans, not the other way around.History was working
inexorably, it seems, to create Germans of Slavs, once the lat
ter had committed themselves to the general project of gaining
enlightenment. In conclusion, this same author claimed that
since “in every state intelligence, not numbers, has ruled,” the
“Germans in Krain have the mission, as history demonstrates,
to raise the Slovene people to a higher level of education, and it
must fulfill this mission, without wanting simply to Germanize
the people.” [emphasis addedji^ x^e writer made clear that his
intention was not “simply to germanize” the populace, for that
would involve forcing an emancipation that only education and
Deutschtum in Krain 9-11.
Deutschtum in Krain 15.
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self-knowledge could bring about. And yet a chasm separated
those who achieved culture and education from the “raw igno
rant mass.” The occasional Slovene who wished “to make
something of himself could only do so if he bridged the gap
and joined the Germans. The differences in levels of civilization
between German and Slovene cultures would always remain so
large that Slovenes could obtain enlightenment only by becom
ing Germans: there was no other possible alternate route to
independence and active citizenship.
This pamphlet typified the views of German-speaking lib
erals on matters of citizenship in the 1860s and 1870s. It sug
gested both the idea of universal inclusion (anyone can become
German and an active citizen) as well as the implicit notion of
superiority and hierarchy (only Germans have a valid national
Identity). Given this set of beliefs, German liberals saw little
need to respond to the nationalist challenges posed by Czechs
and Slovenes using arguments involving numbers. They mili
tated against any attempt to pin down Germanness and the
German community by specific location or population statis
tics. Relief maps marking German territories were the furthest
thing from their minds; after all, their understanding of na
tional identity implied that any territory in Central Europe
could become German and that Germanness could not be lim
ited simply to places where German speakers constituted a
numerical majority. German power in the monarchy, they be
lieved, derived not from numbers but from an advanced civili
zation that guaranteed German its privileged position as the
language of the bureaucracy and the language of instruction at
all Austrian universities, from Graz to Prague, from Lemberg
(Lvov) to Czernowltz (Cemauti).
Historians traditionally believed that this attitude changed
abruptly in 1866 when Prussia defeated Austria militarily and
ejected it from the German Confederation. In particular they
claimed that this event launched a significant German na
tionalist movement that sought to join the primarily German
speaking regions of Austria to the new German Empire. Yet
with the exception of a politically insignificant minority, most
German-speaking Austrians did not adopt this view.i^ Modem
1865 the emperor had suspended the constitution of 1861, and
most Austrian German politicians interpreted the defeat of 1866 in moral
terms as a result of this egregious form of government misrule. They used the
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nationalist movements do not grow out of simple facts such as
language use or objective appraisals of census results. And in
Austria in the 1860s, the political power and cultural hegem
ony of the German middle classes was still very much on the
rise. Only a year later in 1867 the German liberals in Austria
celebrated their greatest political triumph as the emperor re
luctantly conceded to their demands for a real constitution.
The simultaneous division of the empire into self-administering
Austrian and Hungarian halves in 1867 only reinforced the
notion of a predominantly German cultural identity for the
western half.
These political circumstances changed only In the 1880s
when the German liberals unexpectedly lost their majority in
the Austrian Parliament. Still, it was not the fall of the German
Liberal cabinet that changed people’s views on national iden
tity so much as the aggressively anti-Liberal and explicitly
anti-German tone adopted by the new government. This coali
tion of conservative, clerical, and Slavic nationalist parties un
der Count Eduard Taaffe, known as the Iron Ring, created an
Austrian state that no longer explicitly endorsed the privileges
of German culture and language.^® The new government
moved quickly to pass a series of laws designed to equalize
Czech and German language use in provincial courts in Bo
hemia and Moravia, and it divided the Charles University in
Prague into German and Czech-language sections. By them
selves these measures did not necessarily constitute an attack
on the interests of German nationalists. The second measure
had in fact attracted some German liberal support in the
1870s when it was first debated. The new government, how
ever, framed this legislation explicitly as a well-deserved con
cession to the Czech nationalist parties and thereby caused
panic among German liberals in Bohemia and Moravia. The
same thing occurred when the government decided to reduce
suffrage requirements from ten to five gulden in annual taxes.
Although some German liberals had proposed similar meas
ures in the 1870s, they now saw the measure as a blatant atdefeat as an opportunity to argue for a restoration of the constitution and an
expansion of the civic rights that it had guaranteed.
On the advent of the Iron Ring and its policies see W. Jenks, Austria
under the Iron Ring 1879-1893 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia
Press, 1965).
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tempt to alter the balance of power in favor of the Slavic par
ties in Parliament. In ethnically mixed provinces, German
speakers tended to belong to the wealthier urban commercial
and industrial classes, while Czechs and Slovenes were pri
marily peasants or involved in rural industries. The govern
ment’s lowering of the franchise tax requirements tended to
increase the proportion of Slavic to German voters.
It was only at this point that German national identity be
came detached from its traditional association with the central
state. With this detachment came a politicization of German
nationality as a means of combating the hostile new order that
had taken over the reins of government. Self-identified German
liberal nationalists developed defensive strategies against the
new government’s policies, strategies modeled on successful
Czech nationalist politics as well as on liberal organizational
traditions. A network of regional and interregional voluntary
associations based on the example of liberal political clubs,
and organized around nationalist Issues, spearheaded the new
movement.
These associations published universalist appeals, inviting
all Germans to join in a common venture that outweighed any
possible social or political distinctions,
In doing so, they be
gan subtly to transform the earlier liberal appeal to a culture of
elite humanism into an ethnically limited vision of nation
based on linguistic and cultural ties. Within that nation, rela
tions would be egalitarian, since members of any class or de
gree of education would share a common right to Germanness.
“The German national movement,” wrote one activist in 1881,

These organizations, like their liberal predecessors, tended to reward
their wealthier or better educated members with higher status positions of
leadership. In this sense they inherited the liberal principles that combined a
rhetoric of universal paitlcipaUon with an implicit system of social deference
that privileged the wealthier or better educated members of a community.
Lower middle-class German nationalists, frustrated by their inability to gain
much Influence in this new nationalist movement, often turned to anti-Semitic
German nationalism as a more democratic alternative. See Pieter M. Judson,
“‘Whether Race or Conviction Should Be the Standard’: National IdenUty and
Liberal Politics in 19th-century Austria,” Austrian History Yearbook 22 (1991):
76-95.
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knows no division of the community interest into individual
interests ... the movement detests political organizations that
try to invent and sharpen differences between city and coun
tryside. We Austro-Germans desire the welfare of our united
people; every member of the race, whether in priest’s or bu
reaucrat’s dress, whether in Burger or farmer’s clothing, is
welcome in our national union.

The appeal not only worked to erase potential class differences
within an imagined German community: it also began, however
subtly, to delineate the spatial dimensions of that national
community, cleeirly locating it in both the city and the coun
tryside. Since, in fact, those in the countryside had expressed
very little interest in nationalist issues up until this moment, it
was important to locate national identity as much in the rural
areas as in urban ones.
The new nationalist associations emerged primarily, but
not exclusively, in ethnically mixed regions, often to combat
incursions by rival Czech nationalist organizations, which had
themselves been busy defining local politics in terms of na
tionalist identity for over a decade. As language use replaced
humanist ideals or financial accomplishment as the primary
standard for measuring an individual’s identity, and as knowl
edge of German no longer guaranteed local supremacy, activ
ists increasingly worried about numbers. They aimed to regain
political power by mobilizing superior numbers, to mobilize
new social groups into the public political sphere where they
could reinforce German nationalist claims to social privilege.
Still, liberal nationalists faced several dilemmas as they strug
gled to create a politics organized around national identity.
They sought to recruit new social forces to help strengthen
their movement without unleashing the violence of a social
revolution. The task was epic in proportions, for it required co
ordination among several ambitious projects. If all German
speakers had to be convinced of the primacy of their German
national Identity—itself no small task—they also had to be
mobilized in a useful, controlled way, one that did not endan
ger bourgeois leadership within this expanded German com
munity.
Hans Stlngl, Die Nationalveretne der deutschen Burger und Bauem
(Krems, 1881) 2-3.
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I have dealt elsewhere with the specific ways in which lib
erals worked to control this mobilization by defining the exter
nal marks of Germanness in terms of bourgeois modes of be
havior,
Here 1 am more concerned with examining the other
half of the equation, namely with the question of national
rhetoric: just how did activists generate enthusiasm for na
tional identity at the local level? How did they manage the
ideological transformation of the German community from an
abstract but exclusive collective hovering over Central Europe
to one more tangibly rooted in local situations and landscapes?
How did nationalist activists embed new ideas about national
identity in a context of local identities? How, for example, did
activists create a belief that profound differences separated
neighbors who had hitherto shared several elements of local
identity in a multilingual society?
The activists who promulgated the new nationalist identi
ties drew from a fairly limited repertoire derived from their po
litical experiences in the old liberal-dominated polity of the
1860s and 1870s. At first, their liberalism shaped the national
ist identities they constructed. Like liberalism, which had theo
retically transcended the boundaries of ethnicity, region, or
religion, the new nation constituted a community whose mem
bers, of whatever class background, shared a fundamental
identity, one that far outweighed their real-world social differ
ences. Yet also like liberalism, the new nationalism was organ
ized around a series of essential differences, hierarchically ar
ranged, separating members of the German community from
members of other nations. If language use was to serve as the
primary measure of this national identity—rather than educa
tion or accomplishment—it would still be within a liberal con
ceptual framework. The strategies for locating this new na
tional identity in local contexts were organized around a recon
ceptualization of the local landscape according to terms derived
from history and geography.
The first and most critical of these strategies involved the
idea of the frontier, the border, the geographic place where op
posing nations met and confronted each other, the setting for
See Judson, “‘Whether Race or Conviction Should Be the Standard’”
and “Inventing Germans: Class, Nationality and Colonial Fantasy at the Mar
gins of the Hapsburg Monarchy,” Social Analysis 33, special issue Nations,
Colonies and Metropoles, ed. Daniel Segal and Richard Handler (1993): 47-67.
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the colossal and daily struggle between nations.
Language
use was the critical marker of identity that situated the indi
vidual in this newly nationalized geographic setting. Regions in
Bohemia, Moravia, or Styria became known as frontiers, al
though not because of their relative geographic or economic
marginality to the rest of the monarchy. 20 Rather, the term
indicated that German speakers in these territories lived
among peoples who spoke other languages.21
While people on this frontier fought daily battles to main
tain their German identity, others in the centers of German
culture mobilized to support them, like home-front volunteers
during a war. The Vienna-based German School Association
[Deutscher Schulverein], for example, worked to awaken Ger
mans all over the monarchy to the plight of their brethren on
the frontier. This organization, founded in 1880, raised money
to fund schools in ethnically mixed regions where not enough
German-speaking children lived to warrant state support for
German-language schools.22 Using an alarmist rhetoric which
This struggle was conceptualized by some in terms borrowed from the
colonial experiences of Britain, France, and Germany. Certainly, the reconcep
tualization of Germans as a people bringing civilization to the rugged, uncivi
lized East suggests this comparison, as did the Lockean notion that the Slavs,
like other colonized peoples, forfeited ownership of the land because they
could not cultivate it as productively as the Germans. The comparison, al
though powerful, is mainly a rhetorical one, since economic relations in the
disputed territories do not resemble the colonizing experiences of Europeans
in Africa, Asia, or the Americas.
2° In the 1880s Bohemia and Moravia were in fact the most important
centers of industrial production in the monarchy.
2* The historian must be careful to avoid lending any credence to the
notion that inhabitants of ethnically mixed regions somehow had a prior
authentic national identity due to their language use, even if they remained
technically unwilling to see themselves in such terms. In many regions of the
monarchy individuals used several languages depending on the social context,
whether domestic, public, or commercial. According to earlier definitions, a
good knowledge of German might qualify an individual for a German identity,
even though he might use a different language at home. By the 1880s, how
ever, such an assumption no longer held true.
22 For the state to support a primary school in a given language, there
had to be at least forty school-age children in a single locality who spoke that
language.
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suggested that the German language was dying out “on the
frontier” for laek of German-language schools, the association
rapidly gained the highest membership—over 100,000—of any
bourgeois organization in Central Europe. As they adopted a
rhetoric of numbers and national competition, activists also
broadened their concerns from schooling to creating economic
opportunities for German speakers of the working classes who
might otherwise emigrate. By claiming to address a variety of
specifically local social problems, albeit in nationalist terms,
these organizations quickly gained a significant following for
themselves in the ethnically mixed regions.
The Union of the Bohemian Woods, for example, spon
sored educational and apprenticeship programs for workers
and employment bureaus and craft fairs to improve economic
opportunities for artisans. It admonished its female members
to hire only German-speaking domestics, and it also worked to
lower the rate of illegitimate births and alcoholism among
German-speaking working women. In an effort to lure tourists
away from nearby Bavaria, the union even published guide
books that touted the splendors of hiking the hills of southern
Bohemia.
The Sudmark, founded in 1889 to protect German inter
ests from Slovene attack in South Styria, went so far as to
promote immigration by poor farming families from South
Germany. This organization hoped to buy up land that it could
then make available to settlers at reduced rates and “gradually
create bridges among the urban islands” of German speakers
that dotted an imagined ocean of Slovenes.^^
organization
openly admitted its goal, “not simply to protect existing
[German] property” but to “win new land.” Another association,
the Union of Germans in North Moravia, also promised to “win
back ...territory that once belonged to us.”^^
Like the idea of the frontier, the new term Sprachinsel
(literally, “language island”) was another strategic innovation,
coined to refer to towns inhabited by a majority of German
speakers surrounded by a Slavic rural population. The chang
ing self-identification of the German-speaking elite in the small
See Friedrich Pock, Grenzwacht im Sudosten: etn halbes Jahrhundert
Sudmark (Graz, 1940) 8.

“Der Bund der Deutschen Nordmahrens" in Deutsche Volkskalender
Jur das Jahr 1888 (Olmutz: Alpenland-Buchhandlung Sudmark, 1888) 5.
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Moravian city of Iglau mentioned at the outset again provides
an instructive example. In the 1850s, a travel account written
by a prominent Moravian casually mentioned that while “the
language of the inhabitants [of Iglau] is predominantly German
... the domestic servants speak mostly Bohemian or Moravian.”
Like other German-speaking liberals of his time, the author
unselfconsciously linked language use to class position and
not to membership in sepeirately defined cultural or national
communities. He did not even refer to the language spoken by
the servants as a single rival language, Czech, which would
imply national competition, but simply as local dialects
{Bohemian and Moravian). Thirty-five years later, however,
when the city’s political leaders created the German Associa
tion for Iglau, they dramatized their national isolation by invok
ing the spatial metaphor of the island. Their program vowed “to
nurture and protect the Germanic basis of our language is
land, to keep it undiminished and unbowed.”^® Creating an
image of an island under siege, they redefined local identity
along national lines. They downplayed the attention to class
position that had struck the earlier observer as the more sig
nificant form of difference while mapping their linguistic iden
tity using a geographic metaphor.
As part of yet another strategy to make the national status
of these frontiers and islands visible to their inhabitants, Ger
man activists pointed to an array of local physical markers as
the repositories of German identity. These markers might be
cultural repositories of Germanness, as in the case of architec
tural and farming styles, or what I refer to as stones. Yet the
very physical landscape itself might also be claimed as a spe
cifically German place, as with forests like the Bohemian
Woods. In both cases these familiar markers helped to map
national differences in the confusing world of cultural mixing.
Not only did these signs embody the German spirit of a certain
locality: they also served to negotiate between local community
identities and the larger, transregional nation. These markers
helped to distinguish what was authentically German from
what was Slavic at the local level and to connect those local
German elements to a larger. Central European German cul
ture.
25

See Deutscher Volkskalenderfur die Iglauer Sprachinsel (1887) 7-8.
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Nationalist associations encouraged people to meditate on
the specifically German elements in their personal identities by
attributing civilized virtues like “rationality,” “neatness,” or
“careful planning” to German farms and towns in ethnically
mixed regions. These virtues had the advantage of making
Germanness so vague in content that it was easily visible to
the casual observer (or as one nationalist noted, “every human
activity that raises itself above the lowest levels is German, and
only in the lowest categories does German work share its tasks
with Slavic work”). That said, “sloppiness” clearly became the
most recognizable attribute of the Slavs.^^
It was not only important to establish the visible superior
ity of Germanness: the German history of these places also
had to be made visible. Activists often referred to a civilizing
mission undertaken by German-speaking colonists of the
Middle Ages who had established outposts in barbarous Slavic
territories. Even the recent Slav migrations back into those
territories could not erase signs of German civilization planted
centuries before. Discussing urban landscapes on the frontier,
the Moravian Armand von Dumreicher guided his readers’ at
tention to the few physical remains of this bygone civilizing in
fluence. “Even older neighborhoods in present-day Slavic mu
nicipalities show a German orientation. All of this eastern
culture was planted by German burgher colonists. ”2’’ ‘Today, a
bustling Slavic folk life fills the mighty and worthy frames left
over from a German past. If the German people have vanished,
their creations can still be found. The stones still speak there ..
they speak of that which was and is no more.”^® The stones,
through their rational and distinctive placement, offer physical
proof of the German identity of the place.
Taking this strategy to a new level, well beyond those who
located the German Identity of the region in the ostensibly
civilizing ventures of medieval German colonizers, another
writer claimed the entire Bohemian Woods region as the origi
nal (ur) home of ancient forest-dwelling Bavarians. He attribSee discussion of this and further examples cited in Judson,
“Inventing Germans” and Maria Lammlch, Das deutsche Osteuropabild in der
Zeit der Reichsgrimdung (Boppard am Rhein; H. Boltd, 1976) 37-40.
Armand von Dumreicher, Sudostdeutsche Betrachtungen (Leipzig:
Duncker & Humblot, 1893) 33.
Dumreicher 38.
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uted the ethnically mixed character of much of the region to
recent Czech nationalist attempts to infiltrate the region and
discredit its history as a purely German place.^^ Like much of
this genre, his argument cites historical example in its attempt
to establish an authentic German identity for the natural land
scape. Yet by giving the Bohemian Woods a German identity,
the writer produced an ahistoric vision of that local landscape.
The place is German because it was originally German, despite
whatever developments the vagaries of history have brought.
This epistemological confusion shows how these arguments
merged the older concept of German national rights based on
cultural achievement with a more essentialist concept of na
tional rights based on timeless truths. Paradoxically, the
popular liberal mania for an empiricist, positivist science
seems to have worked equally well to support both kinds of
arguments.
Creolization of language and particularly of place names in
ethnically mixed areas presented scientific-minded nationalists
with a fertile field for connecting national identity to physical
landscape.^° In an exhaustive article entitled “Plockenstein or
Bldckenstein—Chapter from Our Motherlanguage” one activ
ist warned against the various Czechified place names that had
come into common usage in Southern Bohemia.^^ “Pldckenstein or Bldckenstein” referred to the local names for a promi
nent stone peak that dominated the southern region of the Bo
hemian Woods. One of the two, it turned out, was in fact a
creolized version of the original, purely German name. This
“speaking stone” communicated its own authentic national
identity and confirms the national Identity of the natural landseape to those whose scientific tools are capable of locating its
original name.
The same article cited other examples of creolized place
names in the Bohemian Woods region, suggesting that the naReiner von Reinohl, “Der tschechische Schulverein,” Deutsche Worte
(Vienna, 1885).
Here I am not referring to those groups that tried to purify the Ger
man language of foreign expressions and constructions (usually French and
Latin), found in imperial Germany as well as in Austria, but rather to those
groups that sought to replace local place names and usages with the authen
tic German originals.
31 See MDB, no. 2 (1885): 26-28.
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tives had lost touch with their German history and identity. It
was bad enough, for example, that the castle town Krummau
(from krumme Au “twisted Au”) was regularly spelled with a
single m aeeording to the Czech fashion (a flurry of protests
and petitions orehestrated by the same author actually re
stored Krummau’s authentic German spelling to some maps of
the region): even worse, whole Czech words often blended with
German words to create completely new names. According to
this author, the town Unter-Wuldau offered a particularly dis
astrous example of this kind of creolization. Situated on the
Moldau River downstream from the town of Ober-Moldau, Un
ter-Wuldau derived its name from a mixing of the German
Moldau with the Czech Vltava, both names for the same river
{Vltava + Moldau = Wulddj.
Such articles alerted Germans to reflect on the names they
gave their local surroundings. Their deeper aim, however, was
to redefine the natural landscape itself as national property.
HaAdng read sueh a detailed article on linguistic origins, village
inhabitants eould never again look upon the landscape, domi
nated by either the mountain peak or the river, without reflect
ing on their German identity.
The high point of activity for nationalists on the frontier
came with the decennial censuses of 1880, 1890, and 1900.
The publleation of the first of these seemed to justify the new
nationalist arguments, which no longer measured a nation’s
importance by its degree of civilization but by the numbers of
people it could muster.
German liberals read the 1880 cen
sus as a eonfirmation of their community’s decline. This was
largely due to recent politieal events and not to any particular
statistical result. Had they retained control of the political
system, for example, or successfully blocked some of the Iron
Ring’s linguistic reforms, German nationalists might well have
continued to justify their predominance solely in terms of eulThere are remarkably few good analyses of social and political issues
surrounding the decennial censuses in the Habsburg Monarchy. One of these,
which relies on examples from Italian- and Slovene-speaking regions, is Emil
Brix, “Die Erhebung der Umgangssprache im zisleithanischen Osterreich
(1880-1910). Nationale und sozio-okonomlschen Ursachen der Sprachenkonflikte,” Mittheilungen des Jnstituts JCir osterreichische Geschichte, no. 87
(Vienna, 1979); 363-439. See also Cohen’s excellent analysis of the censuses
in Prague.
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tural achievement. Under the new political circumstances,
however, their permament minority status in provinces like Bo
hemia and Moravia itself became a cause for concern. The cen
sus enabled German nationalists to express their losses
through the use of statistics, to map them, to shade their re
gions, and to locate linguistic boundaries with some accuracy.
German nationalists might not accept the results of the 1880
census, might accuse the Czechs of all manner of chicanery,
but they nevertheless used the census as a standard against
which to measure future gains and losses.
In 1890 the Union of Bohemian Woods provided its mem
bers with several detailed strategies for dealing with the next
census. The association changed its goal from raising the gen
eral proportion of German speakers in Bohemia to establishing
that, although a frontier area, the Bohemian Woods was itself
purely German. This change followed a general reorientation of
German political strategy in the 1880s. Recognizing that the
Iron Ring’s suffrage reforms had made it impossible ever to re
gain a political majority in the Bohemia Diet, German national
ists instead demanded that the government enact a complete
administrative separation between Czech and German regions
of Bohemia. If the census results categorized the Bohemian
Woods as a mixed region rather than as a purely German one,
administrative separation would be far more difficult to
achieve. The Czechs might even gain part of the region, some
German speakers might eventually find themselves trapped in
a Czech district, or the government would conclude that sepa
ration on the basis of language was impossible to achieve. Na
tionalist activists accused their Czech counterparts of stopping
at nothing to achieve the latter result from the census:
The Czechs will not even concede to us national rights and
peace in our own regions [emphasis added]: they claim, in
fact, that no closed, German-speaking region in Bohemia ex
ists at all. They want to prove that Czechs live in every part of
Bohemia, while Germans do not, that there is no place where
Czechs do not live alongside Germcms.... One of our rival as
sociations makes no secret of its policy to send agents into
purely German regions ... in order to create a small Czech
enclave there.... If a handful of Czech speakers ...is employed
as servants in a German town, then it isn’t long before some
leading [Czech] personality arrives demanding Czech schools
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... which create new burdens for the German municipalities
and sow disunity among their inhabitants.^^

The writer of this article echoed the class-based resent
ments of an educated German minority, angry that the pres
ence of a handful of uneducated Czech servants might be
enough to discredit the authentically German identity of a re
gion. The bitter realization that arriving Czech workers no
longer willing to convert to a German identity or to learn the
German language might threaten their region’s traditional
identity also led activists to blame Czech nationalists for
“creating” false Czech populations where they would not oth
erwise have existed. As one writer noted, “Until now numerous
Czech immigrants, almost all members of the lowest classes,
willingly renounced their nationality and attached themselves
to the Germans.” The growing presence of Czech voluntary as
sociations in German communities encouraged those workers
who might have learned German to adhere instead to a Czech
national identity.
So far 1 have concentrated on tracing the rhetorical strate
gies employed by German nationalists. But how did these rhe
torical transformations shape Austrian political culture? How
politically effective was this nationalization of local identities?
The old German liberal political culture of the 1860s and
1870s had functioned primarily in parliamentary coalitions
created by regional bourgeois elites, all interested in maintain
ing the power of the central state. By contrast, the new politics
rested on its ability to frame popular local identities in univer
sal German terms. These identities in turn demanded unified
action from the nation against the anti-German efforts of the
central state.
Using aids like the relief map of Southern Bohemia cited
at the outset to produce knowledge about local landscapes and
peoples across the monarchy created important political con
sequences. German-speaking people in mixed regions often
See the article “Zur Volkszahlung” in MDB, no. 23 (December 1890):
241-42. The article provided several “horror stories” from the 1880 census
Involving German speakers who had been mistakenly categorized as Czechs
due to the ruthless efforts of pro-Czech bureaucrats.
Michael Hainisch, Die Zukunft der Deutsch-Osterreicher. Eine statistische-volkswirtschafdiche Studie (Vienna: F. Deuticke, 1892) 9.
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came to see themselves primarily in nationalist terms, and
German speakers in the “homogenous” regions did come to
identify their Interests with those of their brethren on the fron
tier. Together, they created a popular, interregional German
politics whose success constituted nothing short of a revolu
tion in political behavior. The stoiy of the Cilli (Cilje) crisis of
1894-95 illustrates the ways in which this interregional Ger
man nationalist identity exerted political influence. In 1893 the
German Liberal party had finally returned to power in coalition
with two other parties. One of the legacies of the pro-Slav Iron
Ring government (1879-93) had been an agreement to fund a
Slovene-language secondary school in the Styrian town of Cilli.
The new Liberal government had no say in the matter; it sim
ply had to budget the funds to administer this decision. When
the new cabinet took up this minor administrative matter,
however, it was shocked by the Intensity of public reaction.
As expected, local German nationalists in Styria com
plained that placing a Slovene school in a Sprachinsel, an em
battled German town surrounded by a Slovene hinterland,
constituted an act of national expropriation. What astonished
most politicians, however, was the intensity of the response
among German speakers in other parts of the monarchy. For
the first time, Bohemian and Moravian public opinion looked
beyond its regional political interests to identify with the plight
of a German community in far-away southern Styria. Clearly,
these German speakers had adopted a transregional and spa
tially oriented concept of national identity, one that staked a
claim to those territories, wherever in the monarchy, that were
and must remain German. The extraordinary public outcry
convinced the reluctant German Liberal party leaders to with
draw support from their own cabinet or risk losing the next
elections to the more radically nationalist anti-Semites.
The relatively mild Cilli crisis was followed by serious out
breaks of public violence at the publication of the Badeni Lan
guage Ordinances for Bohemia and Moravia in 1897. The will
ingness of German speakers of all classes in Reichenberg,
Graz, Briinn, or Vienna to take to the streets to fight legislation
for Bohemia and Moravia that they all claimed deprived them
of their “national property” ended any hopes for resolving na
tionalist conflict through negotiation. After this incident bu
reaucratic rule by decree gradually replaced the liberal parlia
mentary process.
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Both these examples point to the power and limits of the
nationalist revolution as well as to the far-reaching conse
quences of grounding national identity in spatial terms. While
the new nationalist movement effectively coordinated an inter
regional nationalist system of defense, it was ultimately inca
pable of fostering a positive and unified national program, one
organized around a single compelling understanding of Ger
man identity. If their new nationalist efforts had helped to
bring the Liberals back into power in 1893, it had also caused
their downfall. In 1895 the German liberals found themselves
once more in the ranks of the parliamentary opposition, this
time thanks to the very success of their populist nationalism
rather than because of their lack of committed supporters.
They now experienced with bitterness the fruit of their efforts
to construct a mass politics, victims, in a sense, of their own
success. They had devoted significant resources and plenty of
rhetoric in the 1880s to mobilizing the public around national
ist issues in order to regain control of the state. Yet once they
had accomplished this aim, the nationalist fervor they had
unleashed turned against the state itself. In fact, many activ
ists now regretted the breakdown of public order that accom
panied interregional nationalist agitation, and some of them
began to question the more radically essentialist arguments
about national identity that their followers had deployed. In a
revealing article analyzing the results of the 1900 census, the
Union of the Bohemian Woods seems to have repudiated num
bers and ethnic purity for an older and recognizably liberal
rhetoric of cultural supremacy, to justify German hegemony in
local relations in that ethnically mixed region:
The absolute numbers of the census results are not the cor
rect standard for measuring the relative significance [status]
of a national group in a particular district or region. Of far
greater meaning is the tax contribution, the degree of educa
tion, and other cultural markers. In ethnically mixed regions

For a generai account of the Ciiii crisis from the point of view of party
poiitics, see Lothar Hobelt, Komblume und Kaiseradler (Vienna: Veriag fur
Geschichte und Politik, 1993) 106-16.
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the political influence of one or another nation cannot simply
be measured by the statistical size of each nation

Here we see a belated attempt to bring order and hierarchy
back into the German community from above by returning to
the older liberal values of education and property and down
playing the newer nationalist arguments that relied on num
bers and territories. If “cultural markers” justified assigning
the Germans a greater influence than their numerical minority
status would allow, then the same values act as implicit stan
dards to determine hierarchies within the German community
itself. At the same time, giving greater weight to those cultural
markers diminished the importance of linguistic or ethnic
identity.
The creation of a mass politics organized around German
identities and rooted in local geography replaced several tradi
tional forms of community hierarchy with one standard of ab
solute value: Germanness. Much social and political conflict at
the turn of the century came to be expressed using the rhetoric
of Germanness. If one defined it in terms of civilization, educa
tion, or property ownership, then traditional elite groups might
use Germanness to maintain their influence within this everexpanding political community. If, however, one defined Ger
manness in other ways, as for example in terms of racial
authenticity, then Germanness might become a tool for social
revolution, for replacing the leadership of traditional bourgeois
elites with that of emerging populist activists. In both cases,
the location of Germanness in regional geography and identi
ties had replaced the vague abstract culture of values it had
encompassed in the liberal era (1848-79). If this culture had
formerly hovered tantalizingly over several kinds of geographic
and cultural spaces in Central Europe, it was now firmly an
chored in specific places Identifiable on a map.
Superficially at least, the creation of the Austrian Republic
solved the question of ethnically mixed regions for many Ger
man speakers after 1918, as did the expulsion of the Sudeten
and Moravian Germans from Czechoslovakia after 1945. Aus
tria became an ethnically German state, while Bohemia and
Moravia became ethnically Czech. Yet the fact that most Austro-Germans no longer lived in close contact with neighbors
36

MDB, no. 44 (1901): 5.
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who spoke different languages seems to have made little differ
ence in how they understood their community identities. For
many of them, their national identity continued to be shaped
by the nineteenth-centuiy nationalist rhetoric about society
that had emerged from liberal traditions in the 1880s. This
rhetoric combined public community equality for Germans,
however defined, with veiled concepts of hierarchy meant to
distinguish Germans from those ethnic and racial others who
remained outside the imagined community of German citizens.
But this rhetoric also continued the ideological innovations of
the 1880s, which had located national identity spatially in
particularly German spaces. This helps to explain an apparent
paradox that recent travelers in the Czech Republic, including
this writer, have noted: the vociferous descendants of the
Sudeten Germans argue at every opportunity on their visits
there that the Bohemian Woods, although now inhabited only
by Czech speakers, is in fact German.^^

In the summer of 1989 I made the first of several research trips to the
Bohemian Woods. Before crossing into still-Communist Czechoslovakia I
ciimbed a tower that had been erected in Austria at the top of a hill to afford
tourists a view across the border. The place had been dubbed the Moldaublick,
and indeed, each of us binoculared tourists had a splendid view of the south
ern Bohemian Woods. At the Moldaublick 1 read an informative historical de
scription of the view in a pamphlet printed by the nearby Gemeinde Ulrlchsberg, as well as a poem entitled “Verlorene Heimat” (Lost Homeland),
which was provided free of charge to all visitors. What struck me about this
poem was not so much the expected lament for a lost homeland but rather the
specificity with which the poem located this idealized Heimat village of Gldckelberg in the landscape Itself. One could stand atop the tower armed only with
the poem and locate Glockelberg’s geographic situation, its placement in a
certain valley, and its relation to other natural and manmade landmarks. Yet
it was not so much the geographic content of the poetry that intrigued me but
rather the confident identification of the natural landscape Itself with a Ger
man national identity. That former Bohemian Germans and their descendants
might harbor a sense of ownership about lost communities, houses, or views
is hardly remarkable. But what did require some explanation was the confi
dent endowment of the very physical landscape itself with a transhistorical
German identity.

